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A theoretical synthesis is emerging in development 
studies, taxation studies, business and political science 
that may be described as the new dependency theory. 
Old dependency theory hypothesised the world capi-
talist economy was structurally arranged to facilitate 
a massive transfer capital from developing countries 
to the developed world.  The new dependency theory 
suggests that the net flow of capital from developing 
countries has been continuing unabated for the past 
three decades. In contrast to old dependency theory, 
the new synthesis stresses that this is not only a prob-
lem in developing countries for two reasons. First, the 
net flow of capital is not necessarily transferred or in-
vested in the developed world. Rather, the transfer of 
financial resources from developing countries joins a 
large pool of capital registered in offshore locations. 
Second, there is evidence that developed countries are 
subject to net external outflow of capital as well. 
The combined transfer of financial assets from low 
and middle income countries to offshore accounts is 
estimated currently at approximately US$ 10 trillion 
(Henri 2012). This figure represents nearly 10 times 
the annual GDP of the entire African continent. Put 
differently, for every dollar poor countries received in 
development assistance, more than twelve dollars are 
illegally transferred back to rich countries.
 
For developed countries, the main detrimental im-
pacts of illicit flows are growing income inequalities 
and a weakening and narrowing of the tax base, as ef-
fective (contra nominal) tax rates on corporations and 
rich individuals decrease. For developing countries, 
the problems caused by illicit flows are further com-
pounded, and include poor governance, a large black 
economy, a lack of capital for infrastructural projects, 
and an over-reliance on aid money that generates del-
eterious political-economic dynamics. The impact also 
includes qualitative effects:
• Lack of the negotiated settlements between govern-
ment and society at the heart of the development of 
the European democratic state model
• Alternative funding and saving sources to govern-
ment elites that undermine the need for proper 
state institutions
• Access to offshore financial centres damages poten-
tial for domestic financial development
Main aspects of the new synthesis
• Recent estimates of capital flight and net transfer 
flow from low and middle income countries
• Understanding of the integrated role of and rela-
tionships among offshore financial centres
• Democratic deficit studies in developing countries
• Structural theory of the failed state model. 
Capital flight and net transfer from low and middle 
income countries
It is ironic that one of the earliest versions of the new 
dependency theory was articulated in a book written 
largely as an apology for the Swiss banking industry. In 
the Gnomes of Zurich, Fehrenbach (1966) maintained 
that large capital flows to the secretive Swiss banking 
system add a layer of stability to an increasingly volatile 
financial system. Fehrenbach argues that the largest 
three Swiss banks, UBS, Credit Swiss and Swiss Bank 
Corporation, accumulated about $500 billion dollars 
in assets from third world countries by the 1960s, and 
each opted to re-invest these liabilities largely in the 
developed world. He cited a figure of 3% of their to-
tal assets in third world countries. Fehrenbach showed 
that the Swiss banking fraternity acted as a conduit for 
financial flows from developing to developed countries 
– raising doubts about the conventional wisdom that 
LDCs were net recipients of capital.
2Policy Brief 13· 2012
During the 1980s and 1990s, considerable evidence 
emerged on the deleterious impact of intra-group 
transfer pricing techniques perpetrated by multination-
al corporations, particularly in the mining industries 
of the developing world. The first comprehensive esti-
mates of the scale of the illicit movement across inter-
national borders of money ‘that is illegally earned, ille-
gally transferred, or illegally utilized’ was conducted by 
Raymond Baker (Baker 2005).  Baker’s estimated that 
the global cross border illicit money flows were in the 
order of $1 to $1.6 trillion annually, and about 70% of 
all capital flight was conducted via transfer pricing. Of 
this – $500 to $800 billion a year, or 50% – flows out of 
developing countries to large offshore financial centres. 
A related study conducted by Dev and Cartright-Smith 
(2008) put the figures for illicit financial flows from de-
veloping countries slightly higher at between $800 bil-
lion and $1 trillion. A follow-up study by Dev and Cart-
wright-Smith of the total illicit financial outflows from 
Africa between 1970 to 2010 estimated it to be as high 
as $1.8 trillion (Dev and Cartwright-Smith 2012).  Boyce 
and Ndikumana reached similar conclusions, claiming 
that a group of 33 south Saharan countries lost a total of 
$814 billion dollars (constant 2010 US$) from 1970 to 
2010. The authors work on the assumption that flight 
capital has earned (or could have earned) the modest 
interest rate measured by the short-term United States 
Treasury Bill rate. These figures far exceeds the external 
liabilities of this group of countries of $189 billion (in 
2010), making the region a “net creditor” to the rest of 
the world (Boyce and Mdkiumana 2011; 2012). 
The strongest evidence for the new dependency rela-
tionships is provided in a recent analysis of the global 
private financial wealth registered in offshore locations 
(Henri 2012). Henri estimates that at least $21 to $32 
trillion of the global financial assets or about 18% of all 
financial assets were registered in offshore locations 
by 2010.  $9.3 trillion of this offshore wealth belongs to 
residents of 139 mainly low-middle income countries. 
These estimates, he notes, ‘underscore how mislead-
ing it is to regard countries as “debtors” only by looking 
at one side of the country balance sheet. Indeed, since 
the 1970s, with invaluable assistance from the interna-
tional private banking industry, it appears that private 
elites in these key developing-world source countries 
have been able to accumulate at least $7.3 to $9.3 tril-
lion of offshore wealth... compare with these same 
source-countries’ aggregate 2010 gross external debt of 
$4.08 trillion, and their aggregate net external debt – 
net of foreign reserves, most of which are invested in 
First World securities – of minus $2.8 trillion. In total, 
by way of the offshore system, these “source countries” 
– including all key developing countries – are net lend-
ers to the tune of $10.1 to $13.1 trillion. By comparison, 
the real value of these source countries’ gross and net 
external debts – the most they ever borrowed abroad – 
peaked at $2.25 trillion and $1.43 trillion respectively 
in 1998, and has been declining ever since’ (2012 4-5). 
The growing evidence is that low and middle income 
countries are net exporters of capital, not importers of 
capital. 
The International Private Banking Industry
By the 1970s a number of writers noted the large sur-
pluses of capital from OPEC members’ countries, the 
so-called Petrodollars, were deposited in the fledgling 
unregulated wholesale markets (known as the Euro-
markets) that were rising to prominence as a result. 
Howard Wachtel (Wachtel 1977) calculates that in the 
three years between 1973 and 1976, OPEC countries 
accumulated current account surpluses of about $158 
billion! The vast majority of these Petrodollars were 
deposited in U.S. based multinational banks – but not 
inside the US. They joined the pool of capital, he ar-
gued, located in the Euromarkets. Wachtel identified 
the rise of what was subsequently described as large 
complex financial institutions (LCFIs) at the heart of 
the Euromarkets. His analysis highlights easier lending 
to developing countries in the 1970s, suffering from the 
double hit of rising oil import costs and shrinking glo-
bal demand. The seeds of early 1980s crisis were sewn.
The first comprehensive analysis of the rise of the new 
phenomena of tax havens serving as offshore finan-
cial centres (OFCs) provided evidence in support of 
Wachtel’s thesis. Park (1982) presented a picture of an 
increasingly integrated international wholesale market 
operating through financial nodes, known as OFCs, 
spread around all the major commercial centres of the 
world. The Euromarkets encouraged, he argued, enor-
mous economies of scale in finance by integrating dif-
ferent locales into one market. Many OFCs developed a 
profile as ‘funding’ and ‘collection centres’ to fund Eu-
romarkets operations.
 
Two subsequent studies of OFCs gave further evidence 
for further integration of these wholesale markets. In a 
report commissioned by the Bank of England and pub-
lished in 2001, Liz Dixon presented evidence for the 
importance of ‘financial intermediation undertaken 
by entities based in many OFCs [i.e. tax havens, that] 
is almost entirely ‘entrepôt’’ (Dixon, 2001, 104). A con-
siderable portion of capital flows between these centres 
for the reasons that were not entirely clear at the time. 
The various strands of research addressing the emerg-
ing global and offshore financial markets were brought 
together in a comprehensive IMF study in 2010 explor-
ing the processes that contributed to what is described 
as international financial interconnectedness. The IMF 
findings were as follows: 
• The architecture of cross-border finance is one of 
concentration and interconnections. Countries are 
exposed to certain key money centres or – nodes – 
common lenders and borrowers—through which 
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These exposures reflect transactions that occur pre-
dominantly through a small, core set of large com-
plex financial institutions (LCFIs).  
• LCFIs are systemic players, measured by impor-
tance in global book running for bonds, structured 
finance, U.S. asset backed securities, syndicated 
loans, equities, and custody asset holders. 
• LCFI comprised banks as well as nonbank institu-
tions, such as investment banks, money market 
funds, and structured investment vehicles (SIVs). 
The nonbank entities were often linked to banks, 
including through credit and liquidity enhancement 
mechanisms. 
• Subsequent studies by the Federal Reserve of New 
York have named this world of complex entities 
linked to the LCFIs the shadow banking industry, 
which is larger than the official banking industry. 
• The IMF study also showed that the infrastructure 
of payments and settlements in this integrated off-
shore wholesale market was also highly concentrat-
ed —including CLS (for foreign exchange), DTC (for 
stocks and bonds), Target II (for domestic and cross-
border payments in the Euro area), Clearstream and 
Euroclear (for securities), and SWIFT (for common 
messaging across systems). 
Impact of the New Dependency on Developing  
Countries
What is the impact of large, net transfer of capital 
from low and middle income countries to offshore 
locations?  Many developing countries suffer from 
failing or absent market mechanisms. There is wide-
spread corruption; a black economy that is often larg-
er than the formal sector, tax is generally uncollected. 
There is a clear link between poverty, illicit financial 
flows, failed models of government, and an absence of 
infrastructure, combined with aid dependency. 
But there is also a less direct, but possibly more per-
nicious impact of the net flow of capital exposed by 
the new dependency theorists. Not only does a func-
tioning tax system raise the necessary revenues for 
development; it also builds the institutional capacity 
necessary for long-term development, and encourages 
consensus and political dialogue between private and 
public actors (Bräutigam, Fjeldstad, and Moore 2008). 
More to the point, we also know that much tax evasion 
is for illicit political elite revenues and that the net flow 
of capital from low income countries through offshore 
jurisdictions has a direct and immediate impact on 
state capacity building.
Conclusion
The new dependency theory implies that there exists 
an unholy alliance of vested interests that combine 
the large banking and multinational conglomerates, 
professional services and small and often weak states 
known as tax havens. The overall impact of this new 
dependency is the weakening of the universal tax base 
in developed countries, manifested in the ongoing 
shift from direct to indirect taxation, the narrowing of 
the tax base whereby the poor and the very rich pay 
comparatively little tax, and growing income gaps in 
developed countries. 
Institution
JPMorgan Chase
Barclays Bank PLC 
Deutsche Bank AG
Bank of America 
HSBC
Credit Suisse
Citigroup
UBS
BNP Paribas
RBS
Goldman Sachs
Morgan Stanley 
Credit Agricole
Lloyd Banking
Country
U.S. 
UK
Germany
US
UK
Switzerland
US
Switzerland
France
UK
US
US
France
UK
International 
Bonds
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
4th 
5th 
6th 
7th 
8th 
9th 
10th 
11th 
12th 
14th 
Structured 
finance
2nd
3rd 
9th 
4th 
6th 
7th 
5th 
8th
US ABS
3rd
1st 
5th 
2nd 
7th  
4th 
6th 
10th 
8th 
Syndicated 
loans
1st 
15th 
8th
2nd 
24th 
18th 
6th
7th 
12th 
13th 
22th 
9th 
Source: (Fund 2010)
Leading LCFI identified by IMF, 2010
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The impact of the new dependency on developing 
countries is a lack of capital for basic infrastructural 
projects, combined with over-reliance on foreign aid. 
The new dependency encourages and facilitates alter-
native sources of income to government and elites, the 
weakening of political bargains and political processes 
attendant to universal taxation, and directly contrib-
utes to the rise in the phenomenon of fragile states. 
The new dependency also encourages an extraordi-
nary concentration of resources in the hands of few in 
the world economy.
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